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SUMMARY. Behavior analysis in general and applied behavior analy-
sis in particular requires a well developed, empirically supported, and
useful approach to human language and cognition in order to fulfill its
mission of providing a relatively adequate comprehensive account of
complex human behavior. This article introduces a series of articles in
which the possibilities presented by Relational Frame Theory (RFT) are
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explored as they apply to issues addressed by Organizational Behavior
Management (OBM). RFT provides an empirically useful operant ac-
count that has already led to a variety of applied innovations, including
several of direct relevance to OBM. doi:10.1300/J075v26n01_01 [Article
copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service:
1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website:
<http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights
reserved.]
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Despite over forty years of empirical and conceptual research
(Dickinson, 2000), the contribution of behavior analysis to the world of
business remains relatively small. Organizational Behavior Management
(OBM) receives relatively little attention at the university level or within
industrial/organizational psychology (I/O) as a professional discipline. A
simple head-count sheds light on the problem: The Society for Industrial
and Organizational Psychology (the American Psychological Associ-
ation’s I/O division) currently has over 6,000 members (http://www.siop.
org/media/talking.htm) while the Association for Behavior Analysis’
special interest group devoted to I/O work, the OBM Network, is less
than 4% of that size (http://www.obmnetwork.com/membership).
A number of OBM writers have pondered this disparity in impact and
influence and a variety of solutions have been offered. Organizational
behavior analysts have recommended that behavior analysts soften the
use of behavioral language (Brown, 2000), expand upon the variables
manipulated (Olson, Laraway, & Austin, 2001), incorporate the use of
more aversive control (Malott, 2002), and expand behavioral psychol-
ogy to include principles drawn from psychological subfields that have
gained a wider audience in the organizational world such as cognitive,
personality, and social psychology (Geller, 2002).
The initiating problem in these recommendations is often simple
popularity, but that in turn is usually laid at the feet of organizational be-
havior analysts’ inability to deal comfortably and effectively with cer-
tain substantive issues. For example, Wiegand and Geller (2005) argue
that those working in organizational areas need to understand workers’
motivation to produce, and that direct reinforcement models are insuffi-
cient. What is recommended as a solution to this problem is a variety of
well-established non-behavioral theories: achievement theory (Atkinson,
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1957), self-worth theory (Covington & Beery, 1976), self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1986), and others.
An alternative is to broaden the conceptual base of the field in a more
behaviorally based fashion. For example, Olson et al. (2001) properly
point out that OBM researchers have failed to exploit establishing oper-
ations in their analyses. By including motivational antecedent stimuli,
they argue, organizational behavior analysts would increase the sophis-
tication of their analyses and yield more potential interventions.
This is an appealing idea, but as we point out below, it inadvertently
says more about the problematic situation behavior analysts’ find them-
selves in than it does about the solutions to these problems. Indeed,
Olson et al.’s (2001) call to focus on motivational stimuli was not the
first time that Journal of Organizational Behavior Management (JOBM)
has published recommendations concerning the use of EO’s (e.g.,
Agnew, 1998). Nevertheless, despite its long history (Michael, 1982)
and superficially obvious applied relevance, no empirical articles focus-
ing on the use of the EO appear to have been published in JOBM.
Olson et al. (2001) pointed to a source of this anomaly: although EO
manipulations have been successfully carried out in developmentally
disabled populations, OBM clients have complex verbal repertoires that
may make these kinds of interventions inappropriate. Workers in the or-
ganizational area are aware that verbal descriptions may influence the
value of particular consequences, sometimes in ways that strengthen
undesired behaviors while weakening those desired (see Haas & Hayes,
this volume for an empirical example), but the technical analysis of
such situations does not fit the dominant behavior analytic models of
such phenomena. As a result, the recommendation to consider EOs
amounts to little more than a recommendation to address motivation.
We have argued that difficulties in addressing the effects of verbal pro-
cesses are at the very core of the problems being faced by the field in the
first place (see Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, 2004).
Direct contingency principles are highly relevant to organizational
behavior management, which is why OBM has succeeded as well as it
has. But the sense that the field has stalled, is too narrow, or needs new
concepts from outside behavioral psychology all indicate that the field
itself is finding it difficult to use direct contingency principles alone as a
model of human behavior. As an applied matter this becomes obvious
given the limitations on behavior analysts’ ability to alter the immediate
environment of organizations, but as a more basic matter it would be
true in any situation dominated by complex human behavior. When we
are dealing with verbal beings, verbal processes may have important ef-
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fects on the efficacy of environmental manipulations. These processes
seemingly involve more than a simple extension of direct contingen-
cies, be they operant or classical. Of course, many behavior analysts
would grant that point, but hope to turn to Skinner’s analysis of verbal
behavior (1957) or of rule-governed behavior (1966) as a solution.
Unfortunately this approach also has a relatively weak record of
empirical achievement in organizational settings.
The present volume offers another behavior analytic way forward:
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche,
2001) and its applied extensions, including Acceptance and Commit-
ment Therapy (ACT, said as a single word, not initials; Hayes, Strosahl,
& Wilson, 1999). RFT is behavior analytic in a traditional sense, in that
its central claim is simply that a particular kind of operant exists. Never-
theless, it carries with it implications for a very different behavioral
approach to complex human behavior.
Now over twenty years old (since its original presentation by Hayes &
Brownstein, 1985), the empirical literature on RFT seems to be reach-
ing a tipping point within behavior analysis. Nearly seventy studies
have been published on RFT and fifty on ACT. At least some empirical
work has been done on almost every aspect of the basic theory, with ex-
tensions into a wide variety of topics faced by organizational behavior
analysts and several that are part of traditional I/O psychology but not
traditional OBM. These include: motivation (Ju, 2000; Whelan, 2004;
Whelan & Barnes-Holmes 2004); attitude formation to unseen products
(Grey & Barnes, 1996); product preference (Barnes-Holmes, Keane,
Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000; Smeets & Barnes-Holmes, 2003);
worker burnout (Hayes, Bissett, Roget et al., 2004); work stress and de-
pression (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Folke & Parling, 2004); worker disabil-
ity (e.g., Dahl, Wilson, & Nilsson, 2004); the ability of workers to learn
new tasks (Bond, this volume); worker flexibility and performance
(Bond & Bunce, 2003; see also Bond, this volume); worker disability
following injury (McCracken & Eccleston, 2003); and worker well-be-
ing (Donaldson & Bond, 2004), among several other areas. The re-
search program is gathering steam, with scores of extensions of the
theory beginning to be explored. Still, the empirical work is relatively
new and several of the most relevant studies are not yet published (e.g.,
Barnes-Holmes, Milne, & Barnes-Holmes, 2005; Bond, Flaxman, &
Bunce, 2005; Flaxman & Bond, 2005).
The purpose of the present collection is to try to show that a compre-
hensive and experimental behavioral analysis of human language and
cognition is here, now, ready for use. It is not a mere conceptual analysis
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and theoretical extension; it is not a promise or hope. Applied exten-
sions are here now as well, and are already having a significant applied
impact, including in organizational settings. Rather than expanding the
conceptual foundations of the field to include concepts traditionally
hostile to behavioral psychology (e.g., Wiegand & Geller, 2004), this
volume presents another alternative: use these ongoing developments in
behavior analysis itself as an avenue to broaden the exploration of the
psychological issues relevant to organizational issues in OBM.
Organizational behavior analysts who wish to move in this direction
face significant challenges, most notably the subtleties of RFT itself.
While in one sense based in traditional behavior analysis, RFT and ACT
are not initially easy to grasp and they involve new concepts and new
techniques that must be mastered. Emerging from clinical behavior
analysis, ACT involves clinical sensitivities that not all applied behav-
ior analysts possess even when ACT is used within the scope of practice
of OBM. ACT and RFT are self-consciously contextualistic (Hayes,
1993), which can be a challenge for behavior analysts without philoso-
phy of science training, or who have been trained in behavior analysis as
a mechanistic approach. Finally, because of its broad implications for
the analysis of complex human behavior, RFT leads to a new form of
behavior analysis, and it takes time to learn how to include cognitive
processes of any kind without resorting to reductionism and mentalism
on the one hand (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986) or to minimization and
hand waving on the other.
For all of these reasons, even well-trained behavior analysts cannot
instantly become experts at ACT and RFT: a significant intellectual in-
vestment is required. The present volume cannot and will not be fully
adequate in that regard. Rather, our goal is to make the approach under-
standable enough that readers can determine for themselves their degree
of interest in making such an investment.
This collection contains conceptual, review, and empirical articles on
RFT and ACT as they bear on various organizational issues. The pres-
ent article is by way of an introduction to RFT and ACT. Our goal is to
suggest in broad terms why a different approach within behavior analy-
sis is necessary, possible, and fruitful.
RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY
RFT begins with the empirical fact that human beings readily derive
stimulus relations that are not based on the formal properties of related
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events. Stimulus equivalence is perhaps the simplest example, but be-
cause equivalence relations can so easily be thought of using existing
stimulus class-based concepts from traditional behavior analysis, it can
be helpful in promoting understanding to focus on a more complex rela-
tion when describing the basic tenets of RFT.
Non-verbal animals can readily be trained to select the smallest or
largest object from a stimulus array based on the formal properties of
the objects in question. Young children likewise have no difficulty
learning such relations. In the pre-school years, however, children be-
gin to apply this comparative relation to events based not on formal
properties but based on arbitrary cues to do so. For example, in United
States coinage a nickel is formally larger than a dime, but around three
or four years of age children generally learn that a dime is larger than a
nickel. As this relation is learned, preferences change as well. A young
child, having directly experienced that coins can be used to buy things
such as candy, will prefer a nickel over a dime because it is larger. A
slightly older child will prefer a dime over a nickel. This would be easy
to explain if the relative size and relative value was directly learned, but
we know that it need not be (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets,
Strand, & Friman, 2004; Berens & Hayes, 2005). Children learn a class
of comparative relations that can be applied to any set of relata.
RFT takes the view that what children are learning is an arbitrarily
applicable relational operant. Most relational operants are likely estab-
lished initially with non-arbitrary sets, and then extended to arbitrary
ones. In effect, children abstract the relational features of the task itself
as it comes under the control of arbitrary relational cues (e.g., terms
such as “larger than”). Once formed, relational operants (in this case,
comparatives) can be applied to any set of relata, based on social whim
or convention. In playing a verbal game with a child, for instance, a
nickel can be said to be bigger, smaller, or the same as a dime, or bigger,
smaller, or the same as a penny–the comparative relation is based on so-
cial provision of the proper cues (e.g., “this is bigger than that”), not rel-
ative physical size. A properly trained child will derive all of the
coherent relations within a comparative network. For example, if a
nickel is “bigger than” a penny and “smaller than” a dime, then the child
will derive that a dime is bigger than a penny, and a penny is smaller
than a dime, even though physically the reverse is true. Significantly,
this relation can then alter other behavioral processes. If the child is mo-
tivated by a nickel due to direct experience in using nickels to buy
candy, he or she will be more motivated by a dime and less by a penny–
without necessarily having used dimes and pennies to purchase items.
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In order to think of this kind of performance as a relational operant
(i.e., a class of relational responding under antecedent and consequen-
tial control), we need a few technical terms to describe the precise per-
formance being learned. By now these terms are fairly well known in
the behavioral literature and book length treatments are available
(Hayes et al., 2001), but for purposes of this work it is necessary to
briefly define the key terms here.
Arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR) has three im-
portant properties: mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment, and
the transformation of stimulus functions. The relational properties are
regulated by relational contextual cues (“Crel”); the functional proper-
ties are regulated by functional contextual cues (“Cfunc”). These five
terms comprise the basic vocabulary of RFT.
Mutual Entailment and Combinatorial Entailment
Given a relationship between two novel stimuli A and B, human be-
ings will typically derive a relationship between B and A. For example,
if we teach a human being to pick B from a set of stimuli when A is pre-
sented, the human being will now also likely pick A from a set of stimuli
if B is presented. This bi-directional quality of relational responding is
termed “mutual entailment.” Even 16 month old human infants exhibit
this response feature (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993). Combinatorial
entailment means that if A is related to B, and B is related to C, then A
and C are mutually related. RFT researchers have shown that the pro-
cesses of mutual and combinatorial entailment apply to virtually any
specifiable relation, such as “better than,” “comes after,” “opposite to”
and so on (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, a verbally competent per-
son told that A comes before B would derive that B comes after A. Be-
cause bi-directionality is not a necessary quality of all sequences of
action, it is critical that AARR come under contextual control. In the ab-
sence of contextual control, any chain would be inverted for example,
leading frequently to disastrous consequences (put on a parachute be-
fore jumping could be inverted to jumping before putting on a para-
chute). In non-arbitrary relations that contextual control is exerted by
the form of the relata themselves (e.g., a child quickly learns that an ap-
ple is heavier than a sheet of paper). In AARR it is exerted by Crel cues
that indicate that a particular form of AARR is likely to be reinforced in
a given context. A child who is told that neighbor A’s dog is much more
likely to bite than neighbor B’s dog may approach the latter animal
more readily than the former.
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The Transformation of Stimulus Functions
When stimuli are framed relationally through processes of learned
mutual and combinatorial entailment, a change in the function of one
stimulus in a network may result in changes in the function of other
stimuli modified via the derived relation between them. RFT calls this
process “the transformation of stimulus functions.” The word “transfor-
mation” is necessary because these changes in function are relational,
not merely associative. For example, suppose a person has learned the
comparative relational network corresponding to the coinage example
used earlier: A < B < C. Imagine that B is given a CS function through
classical conditioning, such that B is paired with shock and as a result
now elicits autonomic arousal as measured by skin conductance. In a
proper context that selects this arousal function (Cfunc) we would expect
that A will now elicit small amounts of arousal and C will elicit large
amounts–perhaps even more than the stimulus directly paired with
shock. Indeed, this exact finding has already been demonstrated
(Dougher, Hamilton, Fink, & Harrington, 2005). It is also important to
understand that transformations of stimulus functions are under contex-
tual control–otherwise when two stimuli were related as the same, the
two stimuli would become one. This is not what occurs. We might sali-
vate when we see or hear the word “lemon” but we would not try to eat
the word (note, however, that the appropriate contextual control may be
absent initially for a young child who may attempts to lick a picture of
ice-cream, for example).
Relational Frames
From an RFT point of view, verbal events are events that have their
functions because they participate in relational frames. Relational
frames are specific classes of AARR that show the contextually con-
trolled properties of mutual and combinatorial entailment and the trans-
formation of stimulus functions, not due solely to formal properties or
to direct training with the stimuli involved, but due to a history of such
relational responding and the presence of contextual cues that evokes
this pattern of responding.
WHY RELATIONAL FRAMES LEAD
TO A NEW BEHAVIORAL PRINCIPLE
Relational operants are argued to emerge due to operant contingen-
cies. No new principles are thought to be needed to account for the de-
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velopment of relational frames per se. They are said to be “generalized”
or “overarching” only in the non-technical sense that these purely func-
tional response classes cannot be defined by the formal or topographical
properties of a given instance (thus the metaphor of a “frame”). A num-
ber of empirically examined features suggest their operant nature (e.g.,
development, antecedent control, consequential control, shapability:
see Hayes et al., 2001 and Barnes-Holmes et al., this volume), but per-
haps the best evidence is the recent demonstration that they can be es-
tablished through contingencies of reinforcement when they are absent.
For example, young children who do not have frames of opposition
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004) or comparison (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2004; Berens & Hayes, 2005) can be taught these frames through multi-
ple exemplar training that reinforces specific instances.
What makes relational framing so important for behavior analysis is
that it implies a fundamentally new behavioral principle. Consider the
experiment mentioned earlier regarding the arbitrary relational network
A < B < C. If B acquired an eliciting function directly C may now elicit a
greater conditioned response than B by derivation; if B acquired a
discriminative function for, say, responding of a given rate, A would
lead to lower rate responding and C to higher rate responding (Dougher
et al., 2005; for similar studies see Dymond & Barnes, 1995, 1996; Roche &
Barnes, 1997; Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, &
McGeady, 2000 among several others). This means that many of the an-
tecedent, consequential, and motivational functions of such importance
to applied behavior analysis, including organizational behavior man-
agement, may not be direct as they appear, but instead are the results of
an interaction between direct and derived functions.
RFT argues that the process of relational framing is learned. If that is
correct, these situations involve a learned behavior (relational operants)
fundamentally altering other behavioral processes. No existing behav-
ioral term describes such an effect. For example, while a discriminative
stimulus must be learned, the process of discrimination learning is not.
If relational frames can establish, augment, or diminish reinforcers,
punishers, discriminative stimuli, conditioned stimuli, establishing
stimuli, and so on, a new behavioral process has been identified, and it
harms the precision of behavior analysis to stretch existing terms to
describe it.
This new process does not explain relational framing–it is an em-
pirical implication of it. The new principle is indicated in RFT by the
qualifier “relational” or “verbal.” For example, the stronger skin conduc-
tance response to C than B in an A < B < C network with B being di-
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rectly paired with shock is not a CS function. C does not have the history
for a classically conditioned function, and stimulus generalization can-
not explain why subjects treat it as a stronger CS than the CS directly
trained. Instead, C is a “relational CS” or a “verbal CS.” (Two terms are
used here because both have been used in RFT writings; each has bene-
fits and weaknesses, and the field itself has not yet shown a preference
for one over the other. In the rest of this paper, however, we will use the
term “relational.”)
The empirical evidence for relational operants is by now extensive,
covering almost every kind of behavioral function. The literature has
demonstrated relational discriminative stimuli, relational reinforcers,
relational conditioned stimuli, and relational establishing stimuli,
among others (e.g., Dougher, Auguston, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert,
1994; Dymond & Barnes, 1994, 1995, 1996; Hayes, Brownstein,
Devany, Kohlenberg, & Shelby, 1987; Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes,
1991; Roche et al., 2000). Given the ubiquity of human language itself,
these findings cause RFT to take behavior analysis into a new,
post-Skinnerian era. It is post-Skinnerian in several senses, but what we
are referring to here is the way that behavioral thinking must be re-
worked to include relational operants side by side with the discussion of
direct contingencies whenever complex human behavior is considered.
Skinner (1945/1972) claimed that while one could do a scientifically
valid analysis of thoughts and feelings, one did not need to do so to un-
derstand behavior because the same contingencies that evoked overt be-
havioral events were responsible for private events. In the case of
non-verbal organisms this analysis seems correct, but RFT suggests that
it is not correct for verbal organisms. Human language and cognition is
not merely another form of contingency-shaped behavior, even though
it is itself shaped by contingencies, because human language and cogni-
tion operates on other behavioral processes. If such recursive operants
exist, due to their spread of application it will be impossible to fully un-
derstand human behavior without understanding the derived relations
and functional transformations that apply to any given event. For exam-
ple, suppose a person is being paid for doing a job. It may not be enough
to understand the directly conditioned reinforcing effects of the pay re-
ceived in order to understand performance. We may also need to know
what that pay is related to. Does the worker consider it “fair,” is it “more
than” what others are getting or “more than” what was “expected,” does
it suggest that the worker is “being bossed around” or is a “management
stooge” and so on. The scare quotes put around various terms in the pre-
vious sentence are there to indicate some of the many verbal relations
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that might alter how pay functions. The Haas and Hayes study (this
volume) shows that exact process, in which formal feedback showing
that performance is successful makes it less likely for the workers to
persist in successful performance. There is little in direct contingency
thinking alone that could explain such a process, but it is expected and
understandable once relational operants are included in the analysis.
Although relational framing operates on other behavioral processes,
this does not mean that relational operants are causes. In behavior anal-
ysis all causes must ultimately be outside the behavioral system being
analyzed (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). The reason for this is philosoph-
ical. Behavior analysis seeks the prediction-and-influence of psy-
chological events, and it is not possible to influence or change psycholog-
ical events except by changing the context of action. Thus, unlike tradi-
tional mechanistic cognitive psychology, RFT never leads to the
conclusion that cognitive processes cause overt behavior. From an RFT
perspective, cognitive processes are behavior. Within RFT it is only his-
tory and context that creates sequences of actions that alter psychologi-
cal functions. But, unlike Skinner (1945), RFT suggests that we must
account for human behavior by exploring the interaction between two
contingency streams: one direct and one arbitrary and relational. Under-
standing language and cognition thus becomes essential to understand-
ing human behavior generally. If that point is admitted, then behavior
analysis itself has fundamentally changed.
While there are clear signs that a tipping point is being reached (in-
deed this collection is one such sign) it is understandable that RFT has
been slow to penetrate behavior analysis. An implication of RFT is that
every behavioral finding must be reexamined and potentially reworked
as it applies to verbal humans. That is a daunting insight, because it sug-
gests that behavior analysis is much farther away than would be wished
from its ultimate goal of providing a relatively adequate account of
complex human behavior. It is also exciting, however, since RFT sug-
gests many non-obvious ways to train tasks effectively, to generalize
learning, to create more flexible repertoires, and to motivate perfor-
mance. As these insights have been explored, many of them are produc-
ing significant applied gains. Because this extension process is so far
relatively narrowly focused, it could be that significant behavioral gains
can be achieved in many areas of importance to applied behavior
analysis as the implications of RFT are worked out.
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ACCEPTANCE AND COMMITMENT THERAPY
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is the first applied approach
based firmly on RFT. It is not our purpose to describe ACT in detail here
since several book length treatments are now available (Eifert &
Forsythe, 2005; Hayes & Strosahl, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999). Rather, it
is being raised here because it shows how RFT can lead into fundamen-
tally new avenues that have proven to be empirically useful, including
work in organizational settings or on organizational topics (e.g., Bond,
2005; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Bond & Hayes, 2002; Hayes, Bissett et al.,
2004).
Experiential Avoidance and the Spread of Pain
Relational frames allow human beings to have aversive experiences
even when there is nothing directly aversive present in the environment.
For instance, thoughts about being fired from a past job may be cued by
the daily commute, feelings of anxiety, the want ads in the newspaper,
briefcases in a store window, a phrase overheard in conversation, or any
of thousands of such events that might evoke a relational frame that in-
cludes the past job loss. The relational responses, in turn, may occasion
various response functions, such as arousal, emotional responses, or se-
quences of thought. This means that, unlike non-verbal organisms, hu-
mans cannot fully control pain by avoiding situations in which some
kind of aversive stimulation occurred. Derived stimulus functions can
transfer aversive functions to almost any situation.
In self-defense human beings often attempt to regulate negative
events by targeting the psychological results because targeting environ-
mental situations is not reliable. In ACT this is termed “experiential
avoidance”–the tendency to control the form, frequency, or situational
sensitivity of private events even when attempts to do so cause behav-
ioral harm. This coping strategy is one of the most pathological pro-
cesses known (Hayes et al., 1996) because it means that the person’s
own history is now a kind of enemy. For example, suppose remember-
ing a past firing is aversive but almost any event evokes the memory.
The person might attempt to suppress the thought of the past firing, or to
eliminate the sense of pain that comes from that memory. Unfortu-
nately, deliberate attempts to control private events tend, over time, to
give them greater functional importance and thus to establish them as
more evocative. The relational nature of the verbal rule “don’t think
about x” is likely ultimately to cue the very thoughts that are being
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avoided, since “x” is in a relational frame with the avoided event. Vari-
ous avoidance methods (e.g., distraction) will reduce the aversive
thoughts and feelings, but only for a short time. When the impact of the
rule is checked (“is it gone now?”) the avoided event is likely to reoccur,
meaning that avoidance rules are serving as a Cfunc for x–perversely am-
plifying the very functions this avoidance rule seeks to reduce. As a re-
sult of a kind of behavioral trap, experiential avoidance may ultimately
strengthen the relations and functions involving the avoided events in
question. Workers may become virtually obsessed with past failures
and the rightness or wrongness of their treatment. Stress, burnout,
apathy, depression, and poor productivity may be the result.
A large and growing literature shows that experiential avoidance
leads to narrow, rigid, and ineffective repertoires (Hayes, Strosahl et al.
2004). This has been shown in a wide variety of contexts, from educa-
tional performance to psychological health, but it has also been shown
in organizations. Bond and Bunce (2003) measured the keystroke errors
made by call center employees and found measures of acceptance,
defusion and valued action to be more predictive of accuracy, over one
year, than measures of job control, negative affectivity, and locus of
control alone. Psychological flexibility was also demonstrated to pre-
dict mental health and job performance (as measured by errors as well
as self-report) one year later. In the present volume, Bond shows that
these processes can even help explain how much workers learn. If it is
unacceptable to feel, think, and remember aversive events, then even
learning is difficult because attempting to learn new things is awkward,
uncomfortable, and subjects one to evaluation. RFT suggests that expe-
riential avoidance is a natural result of human language and cognition
that is then exacerbated by the culture. Fortunately it also suggests steps
to take to solve this problem, as we will discuss shortly.
“Living in Your Head”: The Domination of Derived Functions
Even the simplest verbal problem solving task relies on relational
frames. The problem solving sentence “if I do this then I’ll get that
which is an improvement” contains relational frames of coordination
(e.g., “this” is in a frame of coordination with the events it refers to),
time or contingency (e.g., “if . . . then”), and comparison (e.g., “im-
provement”). This idea is similar to Skinner’s view of the use of verbal
rules (“contingency specifying stimuli”) to solve problems (Skinner,
1966). What RFT adds are (a) the processes needed to specify what it
means to “specify,” (b) the history needed to produce these processes,
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and (c) in its emphasis on entailment and the transformation of stimulus
function, the precise behavioral implications of such a repertoire.
This repertoire is enormously useful to human beings, but the same
verbal abilities that allow human beings to imagine futures that have not
been experienced in order to make beneficial choices in the present may
also allow pathological events to occur. Humans can respond to imag-
ined fears of the future, or to comparisons between the present and what
might have been, or to purely verbal expectations and standards. The
transformation of stimulus function properties of language means that
evaluations may cause the present to be experienced as negative. One
can easily picture reporting satisfaction with one’s job until one discov-
ers that the person in the next cubicle makes twice as much for the same
work. No properties in the physical environment have changed, but the
evaluative frames verbal relations enable quickly allow one to experi-
ence one’s job as unrewarding, and behavior may change accordingly.
The problem is that language is so generally useful that verbal rela-
tions such as these may come to control more and more behavior, even
when other sources of behavioral regulation (e.g., direct contingency
control) would lead to more flexible and successful behavior in a given
context. In ACT this is termed “cognitive fusion”–the domination of
verbal regulatory processes over other behavioral processes based on
contact with the stimulus functions produced by derived relational re-
sponding rather than contact with what is directly experienced. In addi-
tion to the kinds of direct contingencies usually studied by behavior
analysts, in the area of language and cognition an additional event al-
ways directly available to be contacted is the ongoing processes of relat-
ing itself. For example, if “X is better than Y” there is a tendency simply
to respond to Y as less preferred than X, to the exclusion of direct expe-
riences with either X or Y, and to the exclusion of noticing that what ac-
tually happened in the moment was a relational action (to put it into
words for the sake of clarification, “now I am having the thought that X
is better than Y”). Said more colloquially, RFT supports that idea that
humans often begin to “live in their head” and diminish functional
contact with the present moment, including contact with ongoing
behavioral processes.
RFT suggests that experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion are
likely to be pervasive but also detrimental because the repertoire that re-
sults is narrow, rigid, and relatively unsuccessful. This presents a co-
nundrum because even if it were possible to eliminate these language
processes, it would not be desirable because it is these very same pro-
cesses that enable human abilities like problem solving.
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Solving the Problem of Language
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy incorporates techniques de-
signed to solve the problems that runaway language functions present.
By recontextualizing language and cognition, ACT can alter the functions
of human private events, promoting more psychological flexibility.
Cognitive defusion. Because of the way language functions, derived
relations structure the stimulus functions of the environment, but often
without people noting the process through which this transformation
occurs. ACT techniques target the way human beings relate to lan-
guage, so that the process of language becomes more evident and the
content of language becomes somewhat less important. This is called
“cognitive defusion.” In technical terms, cognitive defusion is a Cfunc
technique, not a Crel technique, which is designed to alter the functional
importance of language and cognition in given contexts, even when the
relational network remains intact.
One such technique is the Milk, Milk, Milk exercise, taken from Tit-
chener (1916, p. 425). In this exercise, participants discuss all the per-
ceptual properties that are brought up by saying the word such as its
color and texture, taste, etc. Participants then say the word out loud, rap-
idly and repeatedly for about 45 seconds. In this short time the meaning
of the word disintegrates and participants are mostly noticing a sound.
This exercise is usually repeated with a word more relevant to areas of
concern; in the workplace something like “dumb” or “deadline” might
be appropriate. The exercise is designed to reduce the transformations
of stimulus functions that occur routinely in human language without
having to change the form or eliminate the presence of specific verbal
events. The data suggest that this is exactly what happens as a result of
the procedure (Masuda et al., 2004)
Scores of defusion procedures have been developed. Unlike cogni-
tive therapy, which seeks to change the form of difficult thoughts but of-
ten seems only to make them more impactful, ACT undermines the
domination of human thought when thought is not helpful, so that direct
contingencies can begin to exert more control over behavior.
Acceptance. RFT suggests that verbally able beings will experience
some private events as aversive, even in the absence of anything
aversive in the environment. Furthermore, it suggests that the nature
of language is such that it is possible for many things to cue these
aversive private events, and attempts to suppress them are likely to be
unsuccessful.
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ACT teaches clients to accept difficult feelings instead. This under-
mines their behavior regulatory effects, and diminishes the self-ampli-
fying avoidance rules that prevent exposure, and paradoxically increase
the importance of painful emotions. A wide variety of acceptance meth-
ods are trained: people are taught to notice specific bodily sensations
and to feel them deliberately; they learn to note related events that
“come to mind,” and they learn to seek out rather than to avoid exposure
opportunities.
To ask people to accept thoughts like “I’m going to have a heart at-
tack if I keep working here” without defusion would not be helpful be-
cause in effect, that would be asking someone to accept the reality that
his or her job will cause a heart attack. In a context where the literal
functions of language have been loosened, however, accepting difficult
private experiences may be possible and useful. ACT asks participants
to accept events as they are, not as they say they are, meaning that it fa-
cilitates the experience of difficult thoughts as difficult thoughts, not as
reality.
Values. Although much of ACT addresses the detrimental elements
of language and cognition, ACT also supports the development of ver-
bally constructed contingencies that are likely to have significant posi-
tive impact on behavior. RFT suggests that human beings are able to
construct verbal futures that can alter the function of a myriad of other
events they are related to, and ACT can utilize this property of language
to change the functions of tasks. It does so by emphasizing the human
ability to link current behavior to desired global qualities of ongoing ac-
tions (e.g., being an honest or loving person). In a word, ACT teaches
people how to use values.
Language and cognition allow human beings to work for verbally
constructed futures that have never occurred, and thus they can be uti-
lized to create behavior even when consequences are very distant or
have never been experienced. Someone who volunteers for a non-profit
organization that works to promote world peace or environmental im-
provement, is not doing it to get paid and the work per se may not be re-
inforcing. What is important is that the work is about something–that is,
it fits into an unfolding pattern of progress toward a verbally specified
future.
ACT distinguishes between concrete goals, which are achievable and
obtainable, and values, which can only be instantiated as a quality of an
ongoing action. This discrimination is useful in that values can guide
behavior for an infinite length of time–they are never achieved, they
only apply to actions in the moment. For instance, a person may choose
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to value positive and supportive relationships with co-workers, but this
is never achieved in a final way. One would have to make choices with
regard to this value every day at work. People may create verbal goals
that can be worked for and achieved as part of a valued direction, but
values continue to define new goals.
Distinguishing values and goals and defining values may also change
the context in which individuals evaluate their work. Although it seems
likely that values play a role in the jobs people select initially, individu-
als may lose contact with what they value in their work over time as they
evaluate actual events against the specific verbal futures (goals) they
construct within those values. For instance, one might become a lawyer
because one valued fair treatment for other human beings. One might
then take a job one believed would serve these ends, but might soon see
that justice often does not prevail. If the job is all about goals this could
be very discouraging, but if it is about values the achievement of justice
in an individual case is not the only issue: Reinforcement may be
achieved by behaving in accord with one’s value (i.e., working hard to
achieve justice as a value even if one sometimes fails in particular
cases), rather than always having to achieve a specific goal (i.e., justice
in every case).
When cognitive defusion work has recontextualized some of the ver-
bal barriers to valued action, ACT exercises allow the construction of
new valued futures. In the example mentioned above, defusion work
would be important at the level of verbal barriers that took the form of
thoughts like “I can’t enjoy my work because the justice system doesn’t
work.” Workers may often experience their organizations as valuing
different things than they value, and defusion from verbal constructions
around this perceived conflict creates a context where new relationships
to work can be formed. Verbal relations that can be more powerful in
motivating behavior can be constructed at the level of the individual and
in the relationship of the individual to the organization. In almost any
organization and position, people have many opportunities to serve
something they might choose to value; for example, concepts like con-
tribution or relationships with co-workers would be possible values in
most jobs. In addition to clarifying individual values with regard to
work, ACT interventions can involve participants in constructing what
they value together as an organization. Aligning individual and organi-
zational values in this manner can situate individual values in the
context of organizational values such that they are experienced as sup-
porting and augmenting each other, rather than competing. This con-
struction of organizational values will unite individuals within an
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organization around helping their organization function in accord with
valued ends. It may also facilitate their perception of individual and or-
ganizational values alignment.
Example of the Application of ACT: Job Stress and Disability
One of the most common complaints people may voice about jobs is
that they are stressful. A survey by Yale University reported that 29% of
workers reported feeling “quite a bit or extremely” stressed at work
(Barsade, Wiesenfeld, & the Marlin Company, 1997). Stressors such as
a lack of job control, poor social support, role conflicts, and work over-
load are reliable predictors of a variety of undesirable psychological and
behavioral results, including anxiety, decreased productivity, and ab-
senteeism (e.g., Cox, Griffiths, Barlowe, Randall, Thomson, & Rial-
Gonzalez, 2000). Furthermore, the reported experience of stress may
predict a number of other health and work related problems.
Individuals generally consider situations stressful when they evalu-
ate them as threatening their well being because they overwhelm their
available resources (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). This conceptualization
offers two possible targets for stress, the stressor and the evaluation of
the stressor. The nature of language is such that the second target is of-
ten overlooked when interventions for stress are sought. By addressing
cognitive fusion, however, ACT may allow for reductions in reported
stress even when changes to the organizational environment are impos-
sible. ACT argues that thoughts like “I can’t cope with this job any-
more” don’t need to change to reduce stress, rather only the context in
which these thoughts are held needs to change, and cognitive defusion
techniques aim to do this.
This conception was tested in a group-based ACT intervention im-
plemented in a media organization. The intervention was delivered in
the form of three 3-hour sessions, two on consecutive weeks, which in-
troduced the techniques, and one 3-months later which was intended to
address any difficulties participants had experienced after implement-
ing the new strategies. As compared to a wait list control and to training
in taking behavioral steps to control sources of stress in the workplace,
ACT was shown to better improve general mental health and reduce
stress and depression. Interestingly, it increased actual workplace inno-
vation as much as the previously validated behavioral intervention with
that target (Bond & Bunce 2000; Flaxman & Bond, 2005). Increased ac-
ceptance, defusion and valued action were demonstrated to be the pro-
cesses resulting in these positive changes. They were also shown to
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account significantly for medium-term changes in a cognitive therapy
worksite intervention (Flaxman & Bond, 2005), which suggests one im-
portant reason why cognitive change interventions may actually work.
Similarly, a one day, 6-hour ACT intervention with drug and alcohol
counselors resulted in lower job burnout among counselors three
months later, as well as higher reported levels of “sense of personal ac-
complishment” in their jobs (Hayes, Bissett et al., 2004). The ACT
intervention also significantly decreased the counselors’ negative stig-
matizing beliefs about clients, and process analysis demonstrated that
defusion from negative thoughts about difficult clients was the process
by which positive changes occurred.
In another related study, a 4-hour ACT intervention with workers at
risk for permanent disability due to pain and burnout resulted in only a
few missed days in the ACT group over six months, versus almost
nearly 20 times that in the treatment as usual group (Dahl, Wilson, &
Nilsson, 2004). Comparable results have been found for workers on
sick leave related to depression (Folke & Parling, 2004). Thus, ACT is
already known to be relevant to organization issues such as burnout,
stress, disability, and sense of accomplishment.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
While RFT interventions are already having a significant impact, the
present volume shows that the surface has just begun to be scratched. In
this work we will consider such issues as goal setting, feedback, task de-
scriptions, and workers’ ability to learn as examples of some of the or-
ganizational phenomena that can be addressed using RFT. In fact, RFT
potentially has implications for any complex form of human behavior
that may involve verbal processes.
RFT provides a technical analysis that makes sense of many of the
empirically supported ideas in I/O psychology and general psychology,
but without requiring the abandonment of the core principles of behav-
ior analysis. Because of this feature, adopting an RFT account facili-
tates the utilization of behavior analytic research outside of behavior
analysis and more communication between behavior analysis and other
areas of psychology. This is already evident with ACT, in that cognitive
theorists and therapists have found a great deal to discuss in ACT (e.g.,
Ellis, 2005). Independent of other areas of psychology, RFT is also a
generative source for enhancing current interventions and creating new
ones. Involving an RFT analysis of verbal behavior connects OBM to a
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clinical behavior analytic tradition with diverse implications for inter-
vention in a setting comprised of verbally able humans. For all of these
reasons, RFT seems likely to enhance OBM. As this collection will help
show, it is already the case, even though these implications have just
begun to be explored.
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